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Amended  proposal  for  a  Regulation on  the control 
of  conc~ntration8 between undertakings  (merger  control  regulation) 
I.  Background 
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On  20  July 1973  the  Commission  submitted to  the  Council  a  proposal  for 
a  Council  Regulation on  the  control  of concentrations  between under-
takings1  (merger control  regulation). 
The  ~Uropean Parlirunent2  and the  Economic  and Social  Committee3  were 
consul ted by tha  Cow10il,  and  both  approved the  Commission  proposal  by 
lar·ge  majorities. 
Di:3cuGuions  in the  Council  revealed uignificant  differences of opinion, 
relating mainly to the  scope of the  regulation and to  the division of 
decision-md.ki!i.G  power  bett·Jeen  the  Commis:';::l ion  and  the  Council. 
In its Resolution on  the  Ninth  Report  on  Competition Policy,  Parliament 
deplored the fact  that  the  Council  had still not  adopted the merger  control 
ragu.lation.,  which  \Jould  give the  Commisoio!·I  the  meano  to take  effective 
ac·tiun  at  Coiannl.nity  level  ago.inst  any  irrt:vc::ruible  Btructural  evolution 
v;hich  could scrio:.tsly jeopardize  cOldpeti t ion4. 
Although  present  political  cirmunstance~ are not  very favourable  the 
Commission  cannot  remain  inactive  with  rt::ga:r·d  to  the  Council.  \rJith 
support  from  Parliament  it m'1st  seek  a  way  out  of the present  iwpasse 
in order to  be  able to preuerve competitive structures  within the 
common  market. 
Moreover,  a  policy designed to strengthen effective  competition plays 
a  significant role in achieving more  flexible structural adjustment  and 
maintaining the competitiveness of our  industries,  and,  in so  doing, 
also contributes to  overcoming the current  crisis. 
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It goes  without  saying that  in applying the merger control  rules, 
account  must  be taken of the differences  in economic  situations 
(particularly how  open markets  are) and,  where  appropriate,  of 
exigencies  stemming from  other  Community  policies. 
A fresh  attempt  should therefore be made  to confine the control  measures 
to mergers  with  a  Community  dimension and to involve the Member  States 
more  in the decision-making process,  while  at the same  time  ensuring 
that  the Commission's  own  powers  in its conduct  of competition policy 
are not  endangered. 
II.  Present  position of discussion in the  Council 
1.  The  Italian Government  has  entered a  general reservation on the whole 
of the proposal,  on  political  grounds. 
2.  Scope  of the regulation 
The  Commission  proposal  establishes two  alternative criteria for the 
applicability of the regulation: 
(i)  the aggregate turnover of the undertakings  participating in 
the merger  must  not  be less than 200 million ECU,  or 
(ii)  the share of the market  in the goods  or services concerned 
must  be more  than 25 %  in at  least  one  Member  State. 
The  Council  now  seems  to be moving towards: 
(i)  requiring that  the merger satisfies both criteria cumulatively; 
(ii)  raising the turnover threshold to between  500 million and 
1  000 million ECU,  and 
(iii) relating the market  share  (between 20  and 25  %)  to the common 
market  as  a  whole. 
3.  Undertakings  excluded 
The  Commission  proposal  does  not  exclude any categories of under-
takings  from  the scope of the regulation,  but  the exclusion of 
certain categories has been discussed in the  Council. 
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Public undertakings: only Italy favours their exclusion. 
Banks  and insurance  companies: there is agreement  in principle that 
these should be included,  although the Benelux countries could accept 
this only if the relevant  implementing provisions  were  incorporated 
in a  separate regulation. 
Purely financial  holding companies 1  only Luxembourg  has  requested 
their exclusion. 
4•  Exemption from  principle of incompatibility 
Article 1(3) of the  Commission  proposal  allows  the prohibition to be 
declared inapplicable to mergers  "which are  indispensable to the 
attainment  of an objective which  is given priority treatment in the 
general  interest of the  Community''. 
France,  the United Kingdrom,  Italy and  Ireland have  requested that 
exemption should also be  possible on  grounds  of national industrial, 
regional  or social policies.  Germany  and Denmark  oppose  this idea. 
5·  Compulsory  prior notification 
Only  Italy is opposed to this. 
6.  Division of decision-making power  between Commission  and  Council 
The  Commission  proposal  takes  over the mechanism  of Regulation  No  17 
(consul tat  ion of the  Advisory  Committee  and decision by the  Commission). 
To  take account  of reservations  entered by all delegations,  various 
working hypotheses  have been advanced based on the mechanism  of 
Article 17  of Regulation  No  1017/68 applying the rules  of competition 
to transport  by rail,  road and inland waterway:  the  Council  to 
examine  general  policy questions relating to the assessment  of an 
individual  case  where  a  qualified majority of the Advisory  Committee 
opposed the  Commission  proposal;  the  Commission  to  adopt  the final 
decision which  "takes account"  of the Council's  opinion. 
France,  Italy and the United Kingdom  want  the final decision in such 
cases to lie with the  Council.  The  Commission,  Germany  and the Bene-
lux countries want  the final  decision to rest  with the  Commission  • 
.  /. ----·r-.. ······-· .. ,  ..... _ 
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In the  present  state of discussion  in the  Council,  the search for 
solutions should therefore concentrate on: 
( i)  criteria that  would  allo>~ a  planned merger  to be assessed in 
the light  of its "ffects on  the maintenance of ei'fective 
competition. 
(ii)  threshold  belo>~ which  the regulation would  not  apply, 
(iii) decision-making procedures. 
III.  Pronosals  on  the  assessment  criteria (Article 1(1 )) 
(a)  'filkinr;  into account  of the  international  competitive situation 
(:iecond  subparagraph of Article  1(1 )) 
Thi.s  subparagraph  has  been  added  in response  to  a  request  made  by 
Parlimnent.  Its purpose  is to make  it clear that  account  must  be 
taken of the  competitive situation and  the  development  of trade 
at  international level. 
(b) Reference  to  the  Community  dimcn3ion  of the merger 
(Second  subparagraph of Article 1(1)) 
Such  reference is  intended to make  it clearer that,  as  >~as  the 
inLention with the original  Commission  proposal,  the regulation 
is to  apply to mergers  Hhich  are of a  scale that  transcend the 
national  context  and produce  effects  at  Community  level. 
(c)  Introduction of a  market  share  criterion 
(Third subparagraph of Article 1(1)- new) 
In its original  proposal,  the  Commission  applied a  market  share 
criterion,  in addition to  turnover,  as  a  quantitative threshold 
below  which  Community  merger  control  would  not  apply.  It set the 
threshold at  25  %  of the relevant  market  in a  member  country. 
As  pointed out  above  (last sentence of paragraph  2,  point  II, 
page  2),  the  Council  seems  to be moving towards the view that this 
quantitative criterion,  as  the threshold below which  the regulation 
would not  apply,  should be between  20 %  and 25 %  of the  common 
market  as  a  whole. 
.;. 
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The  market  share criterion would then be  one  that  would be difficult 
to apply  and  would be inappropriate for determining the scope  of 
the regulation. 
The  reason is that,  if it is difficult to determine a  market  share 
with precision at national  level,  as is shown  by  experience in 
Germany  and the United Kingdom,  the difficulty is even greater at 
common  market  level,  both for the undertakings  concerned and for 
the  Commission,  creating legal uncertainty for undertakings. 
However,  market  share,  used as  an  indicator of market  structure, 
is without  any  doubt  an  important  element  in assessing whether  a 
merger  threatens to eliminate effective competition.  It is there-
fore  proposed that the market  share criterion be retained as  an 
assessment  criterion. 
As  regards  the definition of the geographical  market  to be  taken 
into account,  it is  proposed that,  in order to make  it clear that 
the  Community  control  applies only to mergers  with  effects on 
competition at  common  market  level,  reference be  made  to the 
market  share  in the  common  market  as  a  whole.  On  this point,  the 
proposal  coincides  1-1i th the vievl  emerging in the  Council. 
As  far as  the threahold is concerned,  it is  proposed that this  be 
fixed at  20  %:  taking the  common  market  as  a  whole,  a  market  share 
of 20 %  may  reprasent  a  critical threshold for the working of 
competition,  rega1·dless  of the  market  shares held by competitors. 
This  is because,  in a  market  Ylith  a  low  level  of concentration, 
acquiring a  20 %  market  share  may  result  in the creation of a 
dominant  position.  On  the other hand,  if the market  already has 
a  high level  of concentration,  there is a  danger of strengthening 
an oligopolistic structure.  Economic  research findings  have 
suggested that this is the case.  It is not  possible to  envisage 
a  higher market  share threshold if the creation or strengthening 
of regional  monopolies  is to be avoided. 
.  /. - 6-
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However,  market  share is only one  assessment  factor among  others, 
though the others cannot  be quantified (see the second sub-
paragraph of Article 1(1)). 
Market  share may  nevertheless be used to make  it clear to under-
takings  and the appropriate national  authorities that,  except  in 
specific cases,  the  Commission  considers that,  below the critical 
threshold envisaged,  mergers  are not  normally likely to have 
significant repercussions on  the maintenance of effective 
competition. 
However,  the Commission  will still be able to determine that, 
below the critical threshold,  a  merger  does  nevertheless have 
repercussions that would be harmful  to the maintenance of effective 
competition because of other as·sessment  factors;  for  example,  in 
the event of a  conglomerate merger,  because of the size and the 
financial  resources of the undertakings  concerned. 
It goes  without  saying that,  even if a  merger gives the under-
takings  concerned a  market  share that is equal  to or above  the 
critical threshold,  it Will  always be up to the  Commission,  in the 
light of the other assessment  criteria (second subparagraph of 
Article 1(1)),  to determine that the merger gives the undertaking 
concerned the  power  to hinder effective competition. 
IV.  Proposals  on  the thresholds for determining applicability of 
the regulation  (Article 1(2)) 
So  as to ensure that mergers of lesser significance were  not  subject  to 
Community  merger control,  the  Commission's  original  proposal  provided 
for market  share and turnover thresholds,  to be used on  an alternative 
basis. 
(a) Market  share 
Fbr the reasons  set out  at  III (c), it is proposed that  market 
share should now  be used as  one  of the criteria allowing the  effects 
of a  merger on the working of effective competition to be assessed 
(assessment  criterion),  and not  as  a  criterion indicating the 
limits below which the regulation would  not  apply  (applicability 
criterion).  .  /. 
• 
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This  solution would also avoid the difficulties that  would result 
from  the  emerging tendency in the Council  to move  towards~umulative 
application of the market  share and turnover criteria.  Such  combined 
application would  in particular have  the effect of excluding from 
the scope of the regulation those mergers  which  would  create 
monopoly  positions at  common  market  level but  which  occurred in 
sectors in which  the turnover threshold was  not  reached. 
(b)  Turnover 
As  a  criterion for defining the scope of the regulation,  turnover 
has  the advantage of being easier to  determine  and to verify; it 
also reflects the  economic  and financial  strength of the under-
takin&~ concerned,  particularly in view of the thresholds  envisaged. 
However,  the  level  originally proposed  (200 million  ECU)  must  be 
raised  (500 million ECU)  to take account  of economic  developments 
that  have  taken place and of Member  States' comments  in support 
of an increase. 
V.  Proposal  on  decision-making procedures 
As  indicated in the second paragraph of 11.6,  a  possible amendment 
to the  Commission  proposal  has  been considered as  working hypothesis. 
The  underlying idea is that  in the fields  where  common  policies do 
not  exist,  Member  States  ma;y  not  like to see their national  policies 
jeopardized by the prohibition of a  given merger.  Account  should be 
taken of such  circumstances,  provided that  the attainment  of a 
priority objective of the Community  is not  thereby endangered. 
This  solution would  avoid giving the  Council  decision-making power 
in  individual  cases since the Council's  deliberations  on  the general 
policy issues raised by an  individual  case  would  not  be formally 
binding on the Commission. 
./. - f!-
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The  Commission  could therefor.;  ;>roposc  ame.tding the decision-making 
procedure in this ~· 
VI.  Proposa:i 
The  C<:.'IDm1ssj.un  j s  askel to approve  the proposed amendments  contained 
in the annexe'  text  ani. to formally  submit  them to the  Council 
purtoc;ant  to  f.rticle 149,  paragraph  2,  of the  EEC  Treaty. 
• - 1-
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ANNEX 
Amen&nents  to the nroposal  for a  Regulation on  the control  of concentrations 
between  underta~ings (merger control  regulation) 
Ori~inal proposal 
Basic provisions 
Article  1 
1.  Any  tr•<lnsaotion  which  haG  the direct or ~ndirect 
effect  of  bringing  about  a . concentration  between 
undertakings or groups of undertakings,  at  least one 
of which' is  established in the common market, where-
by  they  acquire  or  enhance  the  power  to  hinder 
effective  competition  in  the  common  market  or  in 
a  substantial  part  thereof,  is  incompatible  with  the 
common  market  in  so far  as  the  concentration  may 
affect trade between Member States. 
The  power  to  hinder  effective  competition  shall  be 
appraised  by  reference  in particular  to the  e~tent to 
which  suppliers  and  consumers  have  a  possibility  of 
choice,  to  the  economic  and  financial  power  of the 
undertakings  concerned,  to  the  structure of the  m·ar~ 
kets  affected,  and to supply  and  demand trends  for 
the relevant goods or services. 
New  proposal 
Basic provisions 
Article 1 
1.  First  subparagraph unchanged. 
The  po~er to hinder effective 
competition shall  be appraised at 
Community  level  and by reference 
in particular to the extent to 
which  suppliers and consumers 
have  a  possibility of choice,  to 
the  economic  and financial  power 
of the undertakings  concerned, 
to the structure of the markets 
affected,  to the effects of 
international  competition,  and 
to supply and  demand  trends  for 
the relevant  goods  or services. 
A concentration shall be pre-
sumed to  be  compatible with the 
common  market  where  the market 
share of the goods  or services 
concerned accounts  in the  common 
market  for less than 20 %  of the 
turnover in identical  goods  or 
services of in goods  or services 
which,  by  reason of their 
characteristics,  their price and 
their use  are regarded as similar 
by the  consumer.  The  presumption 
of compatibility with the common 
market  can be rebutted if the 
Commission  establishes that  a 
concentration giving a  market  share 
below this threshold is nonetheless 
incompatible with the  common 
market. - 2-
Original  proposal 
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply where: 
- the  aggregate  turnover  of  the  undertakings  par-
ticipating  in  the  concentration  is  less -than  200 
million units of accoUnt and 
- the  goods  or services  concerned  by  the  concen-
tration  do  not account  in  any  Member  State  for 
more than 25 o/o  of the turnover in identical goods 
or  services  or  in  goods  or  services  which,  by 
reason  of  their  characteristics,  their  price- and 
the  use  for  which  they  are  intended,  may  be 
regarded as-similar by the consumer. 
3.  Paragraph  1 may,  however,  be  declared  inapplic-
able to concentrations which  are  indispensable to  the 
attainment  of  an  objective  which  is  given  priority 
treatment in  the common interest of the  Community. 
New  proposal 
Orig.  FR 
ANNEX 
/D 
2.  Paragraph 1  shall  not  apply where: 
the aggregate turnover of the 
undertakings  participating in 
the concentration is less than 
500 million ECU. 
Deleted. 
3.  Unchanged. 
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Article  5 
Detailed rules for calculating turnover 
and market shares 
New  proposal 
Article 5 
Orig.  FR 
ANNEX 
Calculation of turnover and 
market  shares 
1.  (a)  The  aggregate  turnover  specified  in  Articles  L  (a)  Unchanged. 
1  (2)  and  4  (1)  shall  be  obtained by  adding 
together  the  turnover  .for  the  last  financial 
year for all goods and services of: 
(i)  the undertakings participating in the con-
centration; 
(ii)  the  undertakings  and  groups  of  under-
takings  which  control  the  undertakings 
participating  in  the  concentration  within 
the meaning of Article 2; 
{iii)  the  undertakings  or groups  of undertak-
ings  controlled  within  the  meaning  of 
Article  2  by  the  undertakings  participat-
ing in the concentration. 
(b) The market shares referred to  in· Article  1 (2) 
near  those  held  in  the  last  financial  year  by 
all  the  undertakings  listed  in  subparagraph 
(a) above. 
(b)  'I'he  market  shares referred to 
in Article 1(1) shall be 
those  •••  (rest  unchanged). 
2.  In  place of turnover as specified in  Articles 1 (2)  2.  Unchanged. 
and  4  (1)  and  in  paragraph  1  of this  Article,  the 
following shall be used: 
- for  banking  and  financial  institutions:  one  tenth 
of their assets; 
- for  insUrance  companies:  the  value  of  the  Pre-
miums received by them. 
I{ -----.,.-·.  ···- .. 
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Article  19 
Liai~on with the authorities of the Member States 
1.  The.:  Commission  shall  forthwith  transmit  to  the 
comperent  authorities  of  the  Member  States  a  copy 
of the  notifications  together with  the most important 
documcnrs  lodged with the  Commission  pursuant  to 
this Rl:gulation. 
Orig.  PH 
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Ne1;  proposal 
Article 19 
Liaison with  the authorities 
of the Member  States 
1.  and 2.:  Unchanged. 
2.  The  Commission  shall  carry  out  the  procedure 
set  out  in  this  Regulation  in  dose  and  constant  4 
cooperation  with  the  competent  authorities  of  the  • 
3.  The  Advisory  Committee  on 
Restrictive Practices  and 
Dominant  Positions shall  ••• 
(rest unchanged). 
The  Advisory  Committee  shall 
consist of officials having 
r·esponsibility for restrictive 
practices and dominant  positions. 
Each  • • •  (rest unchanged). 
Member Srates;  such  authorities  shall  liave  the  right 
tn  express  their  views  upon  that  procedure,  and  in 
particular  to  request  the  Commission  to  commence 
proceedings under Article 6. 
3.  The Advisory  Committee on  Restricti\'C  Practices 
3.nd  Monopolies shall  be  consulted prior to the taking 
of any decision under Articles 3, 13 and 14. 
4.  The Advisory Committee shall  consist of officials 
having  respqnsibiJity  for  restrictive  practices  and 
monopolies.  Each  Member  State  shall  appoint  an 
official to represent it; .he may be replaced by another 
official where he is unable to act. 
S.  Consultation  shall  take  place,  at  a  meeting  con-
vened  at  the  invitatiou  of che  CommissiOn,  not ear-
Her  rhan  fourteen  days  following  dispatch  of  the 
invitation,  A  summary of the  facts  together with  the 
most  important  documents  and  a  preliminary  draft 
of  the  decision  to  be  taken,  shalJ  be  sent  with  the 
invitation. 
6.  The  Committee  may  deliver  an  opmwn  even  if 
certain  members  are  absent  and  unrepresented.  The 
outcome of ·the  consultation shall  be- annexed  to  the 
draft decision. The minutes shall not be published. 
5·  and 6.:  Unchanged. 
7.  If a  majority of the members  of 
the Advisory  Committee  opposes  the 
draft  decision under Article 3(1), 
the. Commission  shall not  adopt 
a  decision until  a  period of 
20 days  has  elapsed from  the 
date  on  v1hich  the  Advisory 
Committee  1-1as  consul  ted. 
8.  If,  ~<ithin the period laid down 
in the preceding paragraph,  A 
Member  State raises  in the Council 
an·objective  which  in its opinion 
should be  considered as  having 
priority within the meaning of 
Article 1(3),  the  Council  shall 
meet  within 30  days  of the date 
of the request  made  by  the 
Member  State concerned.  In that 
case the Commission  shall  take 
no  decision until  after the 
Council  meeting,  and shall 
take  account  of the policy 
g~idelines which  emerged  in the 
oourse  of the  Council 's 
deliberations. 
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